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Of the top ten companies outside the United States in ,981, five were 
public enterprises, and two of these five were public enterprises from 
Latin America.(Fortune, Aug. 23, 1982) On the basis of the commonly 
accepted "folk wisdom,n one would expect that a ranking of the top ten by 
rates of return to stockholders equity would produce a list with the lowest 
five places being occupied by those five public enterprises. In fact, 
almost the opposite happens, The top three positions were held by public 
enterprises which outperformed any of the private companies. Moreover, the 
rates of return of these top three ranged from a low of 17,5 percent to a 
high of 3Q„7 percent, and none of the top five public, (ranked, originally 
it should be remembered, in terras of sales) had a rate of return on equity 
Xess than twelve percent. One of the Latin American companies occupied 
second place in the ranking on rates of return, and the other was in fifth 
place, Admittedly the small sample is biased and limited in scope, but 
this simple exercise indicates something that will become sore apparent 
throughout the paper, that the public enterprise which we are discussing in 
this conference is not the same type of public enterprise that would have 
been considered had a somewhat similar conference been held ten years ago. 
This paper sets out to examine some of our basic tenets about public 
enterprises in the light of recent experience, and may be viewed as a broad 
attempt to answer the apparently naive question: What are public 
enterprises? The first section of the paper seeks to answer this question 
Thanks are expressed to William P, Glade who read and commented on an 
earlier version of the paper, and to Mary Moran for typing the complicated 
tables. All responsibility for remaining errors is mine. 
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by posing 'an even simpler version; Why are there public enterprises? 
Knowing why public enterprises were established may be a useful beginning 
in deducing exactly what they are. The second part of the paper gets 
closer to an empirical analysis by posing yet another version of the 
question: What do public enterprises do? This functionalist attempt to 
describe their functions will be based on Office for Public Sector Studies 
detailed SIC information for three countries: Peru, Mexico and Brazil. 
This will be complemented by the use of descriptive statistics from 
published survey material to compare public enterprises to their'private 
counterparts. The third section makes use of more rigorous analytical 
techniques to answer the repeatedly-posed question in yet another fashion: 
Are public enterprises really different? The last and concluding section 
will summarize the results of these successive approximations and will 
raise even more questions. 
I. WHY ARE THERE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES? 
The first way of answering the basic question "What are.public 
enterprises?" is to examine what they were created to do.(1) It should be 
apparent that knowing why public enterprises were formed should provide the 
basis for constructing a useful set of criteria from which a description 
cusi definition rsay be advanced. This is certainly an initial step as it 
does not consider changes in the goal structure isspGsed by external 
(1}What would appear to many readers to be the first step, definition of a 
public enterprise using a legal framework, as is commonly done, is put 
aside as too complex for this treatment. Parts 11,1 and 11,2 will employ 
different operational definitions. An excellent complete set-theoretic 
treatment of the definitional problem is found in Jones (1975), while a 
broad non-rigorous treatment is that of Böhm, 1931. 
Page 3-5 
authorities, nor modifications in objectives as a result of internal 
©anagement choice. Three different methods may be used to explain the 
actual formation of public enterprises. These are the taxononic approach 
which is based on the delineation of a set of motivational categories for 
public intervention; the historical approach which links public enterprise 
development to perceptions of evolving needs at different stages in a Latin 
American country's development; and the structural approach, which views 
shifts in the role of the state as responding to changes in the polity, the 
society or the economy taken as a whole. Each of these approaches will be 
considered in turn, representative eases will be examined, and the 
weaknesses of each will be pointed out. 
1 • lilt. Taxonomio Approach 
The taxonoaic approach attempts to classify or systematically divide 
notives for the creation of public enterprises into discrete public policy 
categories, based on underlying political, ideological or economic grounds 
or some combination of any or all of them. The taxonomy may be simple, 
where each category encompasses one basic active, or compound (dendritic), 
where ona or snore major categories is divided into finer sub-categories, 
each of which may or may not be further subdivided. 
By way of example, Muhammad's taxonomy of Table "I comprises twenty-one 
different major categories and is an effort to be as complete as possible. 
Looking at some of the categories presented in Table 1, it is noted that 
the underlying bases for the categorisation are not apparent frcas a simple 
examination of the categories. Thus, some general reasons for government 
intervention in the economy may be variously interpreted as ideologies.1., or 
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political or economic. An example of this is the first "to increase 
government control of the national economy;" while the basis for other-
categories are more apparent such as the thirteenth, "to intensify capital 
aceunulation." Some of the categories are not dichotoaous and hence overlap 
with each other in different fashions. Increased government control, the 
rationale of category one, results from the creation of the government 
preemptive monopolies mentioned in the second category. Thus, these two 
categories are causally linked in an interwoven fashion. 
To be as complete as possible, contradictory or mutually exclusive 
categories must be included.(2) This may be seen by comparing reason two, 
to discipline private enterprise," with reason six, "to stimulate private 
enterprise." It times, each of these has been applied within a different 
contextual matrix. 
In some cases, the distinction between motivational categories is not 
completely clear, as between reason eight which covers the provision of 
services not considered appropriate for the private sector, and reason nine 
for supplying those services neglected by the private sector. These two 
merge quite easily. Are services neglected by the private sector because 
they are not considered appropriate for its action, are sectors not 
considered appropriate for private action because they are so often 
neglected, or was the author merely trying to force a comparison? 
While there are many other taxonomies used to examine public 
C2)It would be nice if a branching algorithm with diehotomous sorting 
possibilities would form the entire basis for a .taxojaony. However, given 
basic size limitations, taxonomies for public enterprises have only 
included a few choice levels. 
enterprises such as the compound one of Aharon! (197?)» or that of ECLA 
(1971), Muhammad's certainly illustrates the difficulties Involved with the 
choice of categories. First, it is difficult to be truly dichotomous. 
Should the rescue of Brazil's railways in 190t because they were not 
profitable without subsidies and the subsidies placed too great a strain on 
the government's finances have been placed in Muhammad's category one, that 
of increasing government control or .in M s category fifteen, that of the 
state rescue operation? In the absence of any major changes in government 
behavior to action solely based on logical, discrete, dichotoaous 
categories, all efforts to impose a post-hoc categorization are beset by 
ambiguity. 
Closely linked to this is a second difficulty, which limits the use of 
the categorical approach, that it may not be operational in practice. Even 
when a simple two-category model based on economic and non-economic motives 
is used to analyze the reasons for incorporating enterprises into the state 
portfolio, a given public enterprise may have been created for different 
and overlapping reasons» Placing the enterprise in one or another discrete 
category then becomes a matter of judgment not bound by any hard and fast 
rules. Alternatively, placing the enterprise simultaneously in two 
categories is conceptually equivalent to simple categorisation in a new 
hyper-taxonomy of dimension n , where "n* is the dimension of the original 
taxonomy. It is quite clear that the presence of even more motives 
involves the creation of taxonomies of even higher dimension, with 
attendant categorization difficulties„(3) 
Third, and closely related to the second problem, is ihe difficulty of 
classifying motives of the multiple actors involved in public enterprise 
creation. Only if each actor's motives are identical to those of every 
other actor is a unidimensional taxonomy realistic. In the more common 
case, when different actor3 coincide in a course of action but for 
different reasons, to oaintain the taxonomic approach a recourse to 
.multidimensional hyper-taxonomies is possible, but impractical, 
Fourth, any attempt to do an expert categorisation of government 
motives must necessarily suffer from the limitation that true motives for 
public enterprise creation may be difficult to discern. Stated objectives 
say. and. often do, differ sharply fro® unstated ones. Such would be the 
case of s strategic industry ostensibly nationalized in the public welfare, 
but with the unstated and sore important objective of boosting government 
popularity, a notion which has been advanced as one of the hidden reasons 
behind the new Peruvian military government's nationalization of the IPC 
holdings in 1968, Thus, categorization according to any taxonomy on the 
basis of readily available and accepted information may lead to obvious 
analytical errors when hidden motives are involved. On the other hand, 
while categorization on the basis of insider information may be more 
intellectually satisfying, such information is not often available, and, 
when it is, often subject to bias and manipulation. 
Access to a sophisticated data base management system (DBMS) with the 
ability to handle both simple and complex piex structures (compound 
(3)This assumes that one of the motives is assigned priority over the 
other, that a maximum of two motives for company creation exist, and that 
there were n categories in the original motivational taxonomy, 
• Categorizing according to priority would result in an n by n matrix of 
possible combinations. The original taxonomy is nothing more than those 
.entries along the principal diagonal. 'Releasing the assumption of priority 
means that categorization may be done in a triangular matrix of dimension 
a, with a total of <n + 1 )r./2 categories. 
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bi-directional classifications), and development of a taxonomy for it say 
permit a more fruitful classification and analysis of taxonomies than has 
previously been possible. Such an arrangement may be useful as a starting 
" point for future use of taxonomies. Past efforts, however, based on a 
/J limited number of non-operational categories, have only proven to be a 
useful starting point for analysis, rather than a powerful analytical tool. 
1.2 The Historical approach for Latin America 
The second type of explanation-, the historical approach to the origin 
of public enterprises, attempts to view company formation and growth as 
proceeding through well-defined, successive historical stages. While there 
is evidence that countries at approximately the same levels of development 
have similar public enterprise portfolios, (Jones and Mason, 1982) other 
world areas will be intentionally neglected, and the historical approach 
will only be examined here as it has been applied to Latin America. This 
differs somewhat from the taxonomic approach in that its proponents 
consider a series of motives which governed the behavior of the successive 
administrations in Latin American countries during different time periods. 
In its most reduced form, the argument proceeds as follows. As Latin 
America successively made the transition from being a region of 
export-oriented primary producers to a set of countries at different phases 
of import-substitution industrialisation, the functions of the public 
> sector and the motives for creating public enterprises changed. Since the 
J 
views of FitsGerald (197ft) and an early ECLis (1971) historical explanation 
differ in their emphases, but are similar with respect to their 
periodisations until the mid 1950*3, only the ECLA one will be examined. 
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Until the earliest third of the twentieth century, with national 
economies oriented almost exclusively to international trade of 
agricultural or extractive products? and with major exporting and/or 
producing firms often in the hands of foreign interests, the few public 
enterprises created during the period of early primary-export oriented 
development were expected to meet the needs of exporters. Therefore, the 
state"3 major roles were to provide basic infrastructure, to form regional 
and/or sectoral promotion agencies, to mount rescue operations where 
private interests were not obtaining a sufficiently high rate of return, 
and to sake available general public utility infrastructure such as 
adequate Mater supply and urban transport. In addition, for a rare few 
countries,- some primary extraction such as petroleum was controlled by the 
state. 
A major change came about as a result of the Great Depression and the 
Second World War since the economies of Latin America had encountered 
difficulties in purchasing manufactured goods on the world market, both as 
inputs for the limited industrial base and as consumer items. This set the 
scene for the second phase, the era of easy import substitution of 
foodstuffs, textiles, and whatever simple engineering technology was within 
the reach of domestic entrepreneurs. During this stage alternative policy 
instruments such as tariffs and quotas to protect new domestic firms 'were 
more important than public enterprises. There was also a wave of 
nationalizations of public services and basic transport for political 
motives as well as several rescue operations of foreign firms which had 
become increasingly unprofitable to their overseas owners ac a result of 
the expiration of government-granted concessions or of the government-
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imposed barriers to unfettered profit remittances. 
After the mid-1950's, Latin America was viewed as entering the stage 
of advanced industrialization where the state emerged as entrepreneur and 
< -
as an important producer of goods and services {ECLA, 1971• During 
this stage P since large industrial projects such as the provision of 
capital goods, heavy industry, chemicals or electric equipment were often 
beyond the reach of the private domestic entrepreneurs by virtue of their 
size, costs or required technology, the state directly assumed, a much 
larger role in the industrialization process as the only viable alternative 
to foreign investment since this last «as often ruled out for political 
reasons. 
There are major problems associated with the historical view. First, 
it simplifies the evolution of the public sector, and consequently the 
public enterprise portfolio, to a linear, unidirectional and additive one, 
whereby different types of public enterprises enter into the public dornain 
at specified periods according to some inevitable historical logic. Since 
these historical periods inexorably succeed each other, in an a_, c_ 
fashion, there is no provision in the logic for those companies associated 
with entry into the public portfolio in a later- period hi, for example, to 
have been created by any government during period a_. Thus, the Peruvian 
** government's 25 percent investment in 1826, later increased to 50 percent 
in 1830, in a land irrigation scheme to supply the domestic market with 
•* i 
cheaper foodstuffs would have to be dismissed as a historical anomaly 
because it should only occur later.(ft) Furthermore, that the Peruvian 
government set up in Callao the only naval foundry of its kind in all Latin 
America, the Fundicion Naval de Bellavista, in the late 18*?0s to 
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manufacture heavy equipment not only for the military forces but also for 
sale to the private sector, has to be overlooked because it occurred over a 
century too soon. Such a priori dismissal would fly in the face of the 
stated aims of company creation, which were to lessen the dependence on 
imoorts from the U.S. and Europe, and thereby lead to cost savings, 
(Echenique, 1952: I? 115-116 and Castilla, 1910s 26-27) The sequential view 
of the sweep of modern history in Latin America seems to be unable to cope 
with the reality of early nineteenth century efforts at industrialization. 
Second, the historical view entails an unanticipated assumption that 
the underlying historical process was one of broadly defined development or 
growth, rather than one of contraction and shrinkage. Therefore, such a 
view can never explain how governments could, or indeed why they ever would 
want to, divest themselves of enterprises. Recent work by Boneo (1981) on 
a cyclical model of state intervention in Argentina is an attempt to remedy 
this failing by explaining how swings in the prevailing government ideology 
influence the public sector as a whole, the composition of the public 
enterprise portfolio, and pricing policies of individual government-owned 
firms. 
Third, the links detailed above between stages of development and the 
formation of public enterprises are often at variance with nineteenth and 
early twentieth century reality. Not only is the historical approach to ^ 
public enterprises unable to handle a few anomalies which crop up at 
various times in different countries, it is based on a partial reading of 
m )Ley, April 11, 1828.; Decreto, March 2, 1830; Ley, October 13. 1832 in 
Oviedo, Colección, yo1. 6: 45-48. 
the overall experience. It assumes that political independence was 
synonymous with a rejection of the dependentist economic policies of the 
late colonial period, which policies were abandoned in favor of those of 
the new liberal state. A careful reading of the documents of the period, 
however, reveals a high degree of policy continuity well into the new 
period. While this is not the forum to undertake a thorough reappraisal of 
nineteenth century Latin American economic history, two obvious 
illustrations come to mind. Sectoral development banks in many countries 
were formed long before the stage of easy import substitution where they 
were expected to occur. Mexico's establishment of the Banco de Avio in 
I830 to channel funds to industry and mining is but one example (Potash, 
1959). Railroads in other cases became public after the export-oriented 
stage. While not wanting to argue that a requirement for accepting the 
results of historical research must be the ability to explain each and 
every occurrence of the phenomenon being investigated, it is apparent from 
even a cursory reading of the history of the nineteenth century that the 
explanatory power of such a gross set of historical divisions is lower than 
previously believed. 
Fourth, while pretending to reveal stages of development which 
prevailed for the continent as a whole, this method of explanation does 
injustice to the experience of individual countries» The case of Peru is 
quite different from those of Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay or Argentina, each of 
which had a large portfolio of public enterprises at a much earlier 
historical period. Further, analysts such as Baer (1970), Bigler (1981), 
Montoya (1979), and Topik (1978), who have examined the growth of any one 
nation's public enterprises from the historical perspective have been led 
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to employ a sequential breakdown quite different from the above, Analysing 
the First Republic in Brazil (1889-1930) Topik found an activist state« 
albeit acting at times in a haphazard and unplanned fashion, much earlier 
than the period of easy import substitution, Baer et al concluded that ~ * & 
considerations of Brazilian, national security led the state to invest in ? „ 
iron, heavy industry, petroleum, and chemicals during the 19*10's and early 
1950's supposedly the era of easy import substitution. Montoya delineated 
only two stages for Peru, the pre-1968 limited and timid intervention . . 
within an overall liberal framework, and the post-1968 activist role in 
production and distribution, Bigler, locking st Venezuela for the 
half-century from 1928 to 1978, was able to distinguish five separate 
stages, There? the strong emphasis on basic infrastructure, which began 
prior to the Great Depression, was interrupted in 19*15 by a major shift in 
government policies towards populism, which brought about changes in the. 
types of public enterprises created and changes in the pricing policies. 
This second stage, in turn? was reversed in 195*4 for a second basic 
industry cycle which lasted a decade. From 1964 to 1973, Bigler notes a 
veritable boom in the creation of subsidiaries of public enterprises, a 
phenomenon so important as to merit its own stage. Finally, from 1973 to 
1978 the 0PSC~fed public administration underwent a bonanza cycle which 
included the public enterprises. One can readily conclude from the above 
that in attempting to generalise excessively from the experiences of one or 
a few countries,' the historical approach loses the wealth of detail / 
r-
aasociated with the unique historical experiences of individual countries. 
Furthermore, any attempt to reconcile there differences ic open to the trap 
of postulating the existence of a historical least common denominator for 
the entire continent, whose presence can never be verified through studying 
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the «volution of any one country's public sector. 
To maintain that Latin America as a whole adhered to the same 
inexorable development pattern is to oversimplify the complexities both of 
development and of Latin America. Countries say, and have, created public 
•enterprises attributable to the later stages without having passed through 
earlier stages. In fact, the stages themselves are not sequential, their 
distinctions are blurred, and characteristics of earlier stages are often 
mixed in a hybrid fashion with those of a latter one. The consequences of 
this mixing are that the historical approach is not operational when 
dealing with particular countries, and in addition, that it does not 
deliver the expected universalist theory of public enterprise development. 
Therefore, while it has been useful in helping set up a skeletal framework 
for viewing the past, it should not be regarded as the only unique 
framework against which the facets of individual national development may 
be ordered. 
Sine® the explanatory power of the historical approach to the size and 
composition of the public enterprise portfolio is limited, a revisionist 
view of that history is certainly in order, Until now, the historical 
approach has viewed the portfolio as analogous to a bed of fossils, added 
to by accretion in well-defined layers, with the public enterprises 
themselves, viewed as the fossil remains of past government policies. 
Since those policies were often later changed, modified, countermanded, 
reversed, and then reinstated under different guises, with the public 
enterprise counterparts of creation, dissolution, merger and deliberate 
atrophy, the proper analogy should be to the alluvial deposit downstream 
from a, fossil bed rather than to the bed itself. Studying the alluvial 
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deposit {the existing portfolio) and theorizing about the nature of the 
intervening geological (government) processes is a useful beginning, but is 
no substitute for a detailed examination of the original fossils in situ, 
which must .be the basis for any clear and consistent historical explanation 
of the dynamics of public enterprises in Latin America. 
1*3 The Structural Method 
The third method of explaining the introduction and growth of public 
enterprises, the structural method, abstracts somewhat fro® the two 
frameworks presented above and. appears to promise the best direction to 
guide research hypotheses on questions about the origin of public 
enterprises. The structural method postulates functional linkages between 
the growth in size and/or number of public enterprises and changes in 
econo&ic/political/social structural factors as a nation grows and 
develops. These structural changes may be readily observed, and in some 
cases quantified, leading to a set of empirically verifiable hypotheses 
regarding public enterprises. By its very nature, and assuming sufficient 
data can. be found to employ it, the structural method should avoid one 
major failing of the two methods detailed earlier, lack of operationality. 
While this method has generally been applied to determine the causes of 
public sector growth in general, Glade (1973) has made an attempt to recast 
s few of .the explanatory factors in such a fashion as to observe their role 
in the growth of public enterprises. 
The structural method also avoids an as-yet-unisentioned problem of 
both the above approaches, their inability to handle change. Knowledge of 
why an enterprise was created is important, but knowledge of why government 
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authorities have modified its goals; or why company officials have changed 
company objectives; or why different goals have succeeded each other is 
extremely important in answering the question "What is a public 
enterprise?" Neither the fixed-category taxonomic approach nor the 
unidirectional and invariant historical framework can accommodate goal 
succession. 
This subsection is an attempt to extend Glade's analysis in a more 
general fashion based on two recent works, an extension of explanatory 
variables for the median voter model of growth in public spending by 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980; 326-328) and an examination of economic 
variables correlated to presence of major industrial public enterprises in 
the cross-section comparative static perspective of Janes and Mason (1982), 
This subsection is distinguished from the work by Atkinson and Stiglitz by 
being an attempt to recast some of their public sector-growth variables and 
to add others that would be ©ore suitable as an explanation of public 
enterprise growth. It is further distinguished froa the work of Jones and 
Mason by focussing on the dynamics of public enterprise growth or shrinkage 
rather than on comparative statics to explain public enterprise presence in 
any sector. As will be seen later, the data requirements for application 
of the structural approach are indeed stringent. Nineteen structural 
factors shown in Table 2 are examined and summarized. 
There is a major difference between the taxonomic approach and the 
structural one. The taxonomic method is to categorize factors which may 
have influenced the creation of public enterprises at some given time 
period. The structural approach assumes that change over time in 
underlying phenomena lead to the creation or dissolution of public 
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enterprises. The logical outcome of tha structural approach is the 
formulation and testing of time-series models dealing with the creation and 
growth of public enterprises in Latin America as a function of economic? 
social and political circumstances. However, it will not be done in this 
paper. 
The first structural factor to be considered is growth in per-capita 
income« This results in a growing demand for social goods whose income 
elasticity is greater than one, a phenomenon first noted' by Engel during 
the 19th century in his work on household demand patterns. Extending that 
analysis, changes in economy-vide consumption may be expected to follow 
those observed for individual households for such public services as 
education, sanitation, or health, which services are occasionally provided 
by public enterprises. Thus, as per-capita incomes have risen over time, 
public enterprises were created and have grown in order to iseet this rising 
demand. 
A second factor is income redistribution. Increased demand for public 
services such as those mentioned above by the segments of the population 
which benefit from the distribution also may lead to the creation and 
growth of public enterprises. This mu3t be counterbalanced against, a 
decrease in demand for services on the part of the net losers. However, 
the types of services demanded by these last fro® the government say be 
quite different, so that the net result for the economy is an increase in 
the size of the public sector and often of the public enterprises 
portfolio. Income redistribution may be operationalized as a variable by 
looking at the ratio of median income to average income through time. 
Paga 17 
A third factor is a decrease in the perceived tax burden. This often 
results from fiscal restructuring to taxes with lower domestic impacts such 
as export taxes on goods where the exporting nation can exercise economic 
power as, until recently happened to petroieuns exporters. An alternative 
source of a. decrease in the perceived tax burden is through an increase in 
fiscal illusion, often through a shift in the structure of government 
funding to less-visible value-added taxes to replace funds coming from a 
©ore visible, cumbersome and unwieldly system of sales and stamp taxes. 
Both patterns lead to increased demand for government- provided goods and 
services as the apparent price of such services drops for the taxpayer«, 
A fourth factor useful in explaining the growth of public enterprises 
is a shift in the relative price of public goods and services. If the 
price of a public enterprise-supplied item decreases compared to those of 
other goods and services, often as the result of government subsidies, 
demand would normally increase. An alternative explanation is that prices 
may decrease without the need for subsidies in the case of a government-
owned monopoly with economies of scale. However, in many oases, 
particularly in the provision of services, the relative price may rise as a 
result of slower rates of productivity increase, and there is some evidence 
for the U.S.' that this has occurred. Baumol (1957) and Bradford et al 
(1969) have argued that the relative price for public services has risen 
because their high labor-intensity makes the® less able to benefit from 
technological progress. Some of the items in the basket of goods and 
services provided by Latin American public enterprises would certainly be 
able to incorporate changs in techniques of production, and empirical work 
.needs to be dons on relative pricing. 
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A fifth factor is the general increase in the size of the population. 
Irrespective of prices, this leads to increased demand for 
government-provided goods and services. This in turn is responsible for 
some of the growth in output. 
k sixth factor is a shift in the rate of growth of population. If the 
rata of population growth increases as a result of improved health 
measures, this leads to increased overall demand for at least a minimal 
level of goods and services« If the growth rate' decreases, this leads to 
changes in the quality and type of goods demanded. Thus, change in either 
direction say lead to creation of new public enterprises to meet the newly 
generated demand. 
A seventh factor was first noted by Wagner at the end of the 19th 
century and has become known as one of the underpinnings of Wagner's Law of 
Increasing Relative Importance of the Public Sector, (tfogne.", 1890 in 
Winfrey, 1973' 199) This model dealt with a hypothesised functional 
relationship between industrialization and the level of public sector 
activity« On the basis of an examination of industrialization in several 
countriess Wagner hypothesised increased public production in industries 
which provide basic industrial inputs such as metals, fuel, communications 
and transportation because of economies of scale ana large capital 
requirements, 
Wagner also cited an eighth factor, increased urbanization. This 
change in social patterns, partly, resulting from increased 
industrializationj led to a greater demand for social services, 
particularly those provided at the municipal level, such as utilities, 
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urban transportation and public housing. Since these are often provided by 
public enterprises, the argument can be interpreted as an additional 
explanatory factor for their growth. 
Also related to factors seven and eight is a ninth factor, the 
decrease in the relative size of the agricultural sector. Since the state 
has traditionally had low levels of ownership in agriculture, with its 
sectoral promotion role often limited to the supply of certain inputs, 
principally financial, but also including technical assistance, decrease in 
the relative importance of agriculture in the national economy say be 
correlated with a rise in importance of those sectors where the government 
is more involved. It may also lead to increased government efforts to 
foster the introduction and adoption of higher productivity methods through 
greater financial assistance and direct provision and marketing of key 
inputs such as fertilizers. 
Related to the work of Wagner is a tenth factor which posits an 
interaction between public and private sectors. In order for- rapid 
industrialization to proceed, the public sector is viewed as a source of 
social overhead capital. This neo-Hirschman approach implies state 
investment in those sectors of the economy which have high externalities as 
a precondition for private sector development and also leads to growth in 
transport and communications, higher and technical education and banking, 
all sectors of heavy state involvement in Latin America, 
In eleventh factor deals with technological change. If, as has often 
been alleged, private entrepreneurs in developing countries are either 
unwilling or unable to adopt innovations, public enterprises become the 
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vehicles for spurring growth. There is some evidence for Latin America 
that these decisions may also be conditioned by other intervening variables 
in the objective functionf (Sagastl, 1978: 9*) and further research on the 
point is needed. 
• ^ 
A twelfth factor is political, the extension of the franchise often to 
illiterate voters and their resultant increased participation in the 
-solifcioal system. The net result in the legitimization of previously unmet 
demands for goods and services, which may change the overall mix of 
soveraaetit output. To the extent that these are provided by public 
enterprises, growth may be explained, 
A thirteenth factor is the formation of and increase in activities of 
interest groups. Such an activity provides an opportunity for new pressure 
groups to incorporate their demands for government provided goods and 
services into the perceived social welfare function and explains some of 
the state role as the result of the conflict between early Latin American 
agro-ex porting and newer industrial groups, Vlhile such a factor underlies 
political science views of coalition building, it should be reexamined for 
its explanatory power for public enterprise growth as well. 
A fourteenth factor deals with changes in ideology or social 
philosophy of political parties or of the ruling groups. These have 
profound consequences on not only the acceptable size of the public sector, 
but also the types of- activities in which public enterprises may operate. 
Montoya's division of the evolution of Peru's public enterprises into two 
historical stages is directly related to the major shift in political 
ideology of the military government which expected the state to control the 
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econoay. Ideological reasons are important in explaining the decline in 
relative importance of the public sector and the denationalisation of 
public enterprises. COBFO's privatisation of a large portion of ita 
portfolio under the Pinochet government is a clear case in point. 
The previous factor is closely related to a fifteenth one given 
prominence by Peacock and Wiseman (1961), that temporary changes in 
acceptable spheres of activity give' rise to more permanent changes. They 
s©t out to explain the discrete juaps in public expenditure in the U.K. as 
a result of Increases in the tolerable level of taxation,, particularly 
during times of war. Exogenous factors gave rise to a much higher level of 
public expenditure than had been present before, Once the temporary 
disturbances had subsided, spending dropped, but leveled off at a higher-
plateau than it had been prior to the disturbance. Time-series data, must 
be gathered, to examine if this factor may explain the high levels of public 
enterprise importance in the Chilean eeonocsy even after* a decade of 
military rule. 
A sixteenth factor is related to the observed tendency of government 
bureaucracies to expand their activities. While this phenomenon is more 
noted within the central government, it may also be useful in explaining 
the creation of subsidiaries of public enterprises in Mexico and Brazil. 
A seventeenth factor bears on this last example, the increasing costs 
of hierarchical activities. Coordination and control are areas often cited 
as diseconomies of seals for private firms. To maintain a certain level of 
cost effectiveness, specialized subsidiary public enterprises m&y be 
created to avoid increases in the costs of coordinating activities of any 
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one firm. Recently, in Peru a rice marketer, ECASA, was created by the 
board of directors of ENCI, the principal agricultural marketer. 
An eighteenth factor deals with changes in clas3 interests through 
time. This is conceptually different froa the thirteenth factor cited 
above which concerns interest groups. If there is a transfer of power to 
members of the working class, they will be in a stronger position to claim 
goods and services from the government. Such a factor underlies the two 
main tendencies in historical explanations of public enterprise growth 
detailed earlier, 
The converse of this may be cited as a nineteenth factor. If the 
government uses force to permit increased capital accumulation by the 
traditional owners of the factors of production, this implies a transfer of 
income and of power away from the working class. It may also lead to 
increased demand for public enterprise-provided goods and services, as for 
examples, better water and sewage in high-income areas, or better 
universities for the children of the elite. Not only will the group 
demanding more be quite different from that mentioned as factor eighteen, 
but the sis of goods and services should be different as well. 
The major problem in the structural approach is that is is difficult 
to verify empirically many of the factors used to explain the origin and 
growth of public enterprises. Several of the more thorny issues should be 
considered, The first general problem is data availability. For Latin 
America8 long time-series information going back to the turn of the century 
or even earlier is scarce and often of questionable value. While the last 
decade has seen intense research on and increased publication of consistent 
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data series for some of the structural factors, a major effort is still 
needed. In addition, data on the dependent variable, the sise of the 
public enterprise sector are even sore inadequate. They are, at best, 
incomplete and inconsistent. Increased governaent-scholarly cooperation is 
m@ded to design and develop useful recordkeeping in part associated with 
monitoring agencies current needs. The series, thus derived should be 
pushed back in time so that some of the implicit hypotheses of this section 
can be tested, 
A second consideration is the nature of economic organization in any 
particular country. If municipal garbage collection aay be considered a 
public service whose demand will rise as the result of several of the 
factors listed above, in some cases this will lead to the creation and 
expansion of public enterprises, while in others, it will be reflected 
in a greater demand for government services. Some effort is in order at 
making the cross-country comparisons consistent. 
Third, data transformations to make numbers useful, once they are 
obtained, pose a problem. If a global measure, such as the ratio of 
government-enterprise produced goods and services to GNP is considered the 
dependent variable, it must be adjusted for inflation. The deflators will 
only be the same for numerator and denominator if inflation proceeds at the 
same rate for both. However, price indices for government-provided goods 
and services tend to rise faster than the GNP deflator because of lower 
productivity»(Beck, 1978 and Plata, 1981) It is unclear whether in general 
the deflator for public enterprise-provided goods and services rises faster 
or slower than that for GNP. While the prices of some basic consumer itea» 
provided by public enterprises are often strictly controlled to s?ods~ 
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the overall inflation rate as well as to defuse a potentially explosive 
social situation, price behavior for non-essential services may not follow 
the same pattern, 
A fourth problem dealing with verification is the use of average or ^ 
median income» Reliable time-series statistics are sadly lacking for Latin 
America.. Finally, a fifth factor deals in the issues covered in .the. 
thirteenth, eighteenth and nineteenth issues, the use of relative power. 
Measurement of such an ephemeral concept, particularly as related to 
discrete power groups is a thorny issue. 
While the structural method appears quite promising as a means of 
explaining the wide diversity of public enterprise experiences in. latin 
America, and appears to be able to reconcile what, viewed from the 
historical perspective, may be called the often contradictory sequential 
enterprise formation, data limitations pose at present the major limitation 
for testing the implicit hypotheses. Advances in Latin American economic 
history and advances in our knowledge of public enterprise functions and 
growth will have to take place simultaneously. 
Three ways of examining the question "Why are there public 
enterprises?5' were examined. The taxonomie quasi-definition of public 
enterprises as those entities formed to ®eet one or more of a set of 
government objectives was found wanting for its lack of analytical riser. 
The historical quasi-definition of public enterprises as those entities of 
particular types formed for specific- uses during distinct sequential 
historical stages was found wanting for often being at variance with 
nineteenth and twentieth century Latin American economic history. The 
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structural quasi-definition of public enterprises as those entities which 
grew or contracted in response to one or more of a set of underlying 
economics political or social factors was proposed as a logical extension 
of, but as-yet-untested successor to, the other two approaches to public 
enterprise formation. 
XI» WHAT DO PUBLIC ENTERPRISES DO? 
The second question to be asked in the exploration of the current role 
of public enterprises is "What do public enterprises do? In order to 
answer this question, data from various sources have been analysed. The 
first part of the section is based on information gathered in the archives 
of the Office for Public Sector Studies of the Institute of Latin American 
Studies at the University of Texas. The second part has been based on 
readily-available information for 1981 or in some eases for 1980, 
particularly the Fortune or Fortune-like lists prepared annually by 
different business publications. Two of these are broadly based, covering 
a wide range of companies. They are the Fortune list of the top 500 
companies outside of the United States, and the Latin American Tiroes, list 
of the top 500 companies in Latin America, In addition, three 
country-specific lists were included, those of Expansión of the top 500 
firms in Mexico, Visao of the top 200 in Brazil, and of Perú Económico of 
the top 50 companies in Peru. 
II.1 Country-level frequencies 
The answer to the question "What do public enterprises do?55 is quite 
3implé - "Everything,'' Public enterprises. in-Latin Asierica have gone far 
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beyond their well-known importance in basic industry, public utilities, 
other infrastructure, and the remnants of the colonial monopolies. At 
present they are involved in all areas of economic activity, whether alone 
or in conjunction with private partners. 
-
Table 3 presents frequency information by two-digit standard 
industrial classification for public entities' located in Peru, Brazil and 
Mexico. That the country- and two-digit totals are greater than published 
official figures reflects an all-encompassing definition of "public entity" 
to include jsany found in the gray area of definitions. These include all 
instances of government portfolio shareholding, no matter how small, as 
well as non-profit institutions, the latter including universities. The 
main point to note, is that no sector is without public enterprise 
participation in at least one of the countries. Naturally some sectors 
have a greater importance in the portfolio than do others. These include 
transportation and public utilities.- However, public enterprises are in 
all branches of manufacturing, not only heavy industry; all types of 
Pining; agriculture, forestry and fishing; construction; wholesale and 
retail trade; real estate, finance, and other services. 
The breakdown for each country is a function not only of the 
particular structural factors mentioned in the preceding section, but also 
of the factor resources and comparative advantage of each nation, Thus, 
the Peruvian government has a greater relative stake in the fishing 
industry than do those of either Brazil or Mexico« Institutional - H 
organizational factors also play a role, as witness the extremely high 
weight given to the financial sector in Mexico because of the government'a 
heavy reliance on »foados" and "fideicomisos" to channel funds to other 
public sector entities* Qnce set up, these funds maintain at least a laga 
existence far beyond their expected useful life. Given this brief 
introduction to. the myriad sectors of action, we now examine more specific 
economic and financial data for groups of companies. 
II,2 Country"Level Survey Data 
The data to be examined in this and the following section are froa 
readily available and published business information sources. While there 
are problems of completeness and accuracy, examination of the data prove t 
be useful to see how public and private enterprises differ. Where the 
information was not already provided in the original lists, data on 
government ownership (greater than 50 percent for consistency across 
surveys) were added. All data sets suffered from the limitation of raissin 
information, more severe for the companies headquartered in several Latin 
American countries than for others (See footnote Table 5). The lack of 
complete and consistent data reduced the size of the universe under 
observation by amounts which differed from list to list, final values of 
as well as the descriptive statistics may be found in Tables 4 to S. 
Available data were broken down by type of ownership of the company, 
whether public or private. The public firms in the surveys ranged from a 
low of 12 percent of the companies included in the Fortune list to sore 
than half of those in the Peruvian one. In general, public enterprise?-
appeared more often among the top firms for Latin America than they did in 
the worldwide list« 
While detailed repetition of the absolute figures and percentile 
distributions summarized In the Tables, is not warranted, nevertheless, a 
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glancing comparison of the percentile weights, is useful» In sose cases 
this process reinforces cur notions about the role of public enterprises; 
in other cases it challenges them, laying the groundwork for the hypothesis 
tasting presented in the next section, -1 
First, and not surprisingly, the public enterprises are large. From * 
Table 4S for the entire survey as well as for the sectoral breakdowns, the 
proportion of sales accruing to public enterprises is greater than the 
proportion of companies that are public. In other terms, average sales of 
public enterprises exceed those of the private ones. Furthermore, public 
enterprises in Latin America tend to be relatively larger than they are in 
the worldwide data. More public enterprises in both absolute and 
proportional terms are represented in Table 5 than in Table '4, even though 
the set of oospanies without missing data is much smaller. In addition, 
their weight in the economy is greater: for Latin America as a whole 
(Table '4 and 5), for Brazil (Table 6), and for Peru (Table 8 ) , the average 
public enterprise income is not only greater than that of private 
enterprise, public enterprise income accounts for more than half of all 
income accruing to the largest firms. Only in Mexico, where prior to the 
recent nationalisations, public enterprises accounted for less than six 
percent of the companies, did their sales represent less than fifty 
pere? .it, Thus our intuitive knowledge that public enterprises are large 
fM 
and important is readily supported by the data. 
& 
We also expect that public enterprises are more capital absorbing, 
wbich can be judged by comparing the proportional weight of assets to that 
of the number of companies. For the worldwide data (Table 4), our 
expectations are not met, as public enterprises are almost identical to the 
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average^ even in mining and steel. In Latin America, however, for all 
countries together or separately (Tables 5 to 8), and for specific sectors 
in each country, the share of assets accruing to the public enterprises is 
greater than their total weight in the survey, with only one exception 
mining in Mexico. While.this may lend some weight to the argument 
presented earlier that public enterprises are located in sectors where the 
investment requirements are so large as to be beyond the scope of the 
domestic entrepreneurs, it may also result from the 1970s nationalisations 
of resource-based foreign companies, 
Another'way of-examining the capital absorption notion is to look at 
shareholders equity. While this information is only available in two of 
the sis surveys examined, what is available lends credence to the argument 
that the public enterprises are. those that require large investments. The 
only exception is .major mining of Table where public enterprises have 
lower equity? than their private counterparts. .• • ....¡-.. 
• - . •• , ' f y . 
A quite common expectation would be that almost all the.profits 
reported are attributable to the private companies, while the losses are 
visited on the public firms. Examination of the data, however, shows 
results which are not so clear out. From Table 5-5. the share of net income 
accruing to public enterprises is higher than their proportional weight for 
the entire survey, for the petroleum companies and for the Latin American 
firms. For steel and for mining, the results are closer to those expected. 
Overall, public enterprise losses are distorted by those of two large 
companies, British Steel, and Argentina's YPF, which together lost over $6 
billion U.S. in 1981, more than one-third of the total losses by all 
companies. However, in general, losses are prorated according to 
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expectations. 
Finally,'the popular wisdom holds that public enterprises are bloated 
with unproductive labor, a notable result of their socially-imposed 
objective of providing employment and of rescuing the jobs at private 
companies whose doors were about to close, Again, the expectations have to 
be tempered somewhat as a result of the descriptive data analysis. As 
shown is Table l4, on a worldwide basis, public enterprises' employment is 
only slightly higher than their weight in the whole survey, for the mining 
firms, and for all Latin American ones. The steel mills are approximately 
equals while the petroleum companies show a tendency to jobs creation, 
Latin American public enterprises conform to popular expectations, except 
In the case of Mexican mines, which employ less than their proportional 
weight (Tables 5 to 8). 
III. ARE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES REALLY DIFFERENT? 
The mere description of the various summary measures presented above 
casta doubt on some of the key assumptions which underly our operational 
premises about the working of public enterprises. In particular, one of 
these fco be examined, that often acts as an underlying assumption to both 
the taxonoaic and to the historical approach, is that there are marked 
differences in performance between public and private firms. This 
assumption, which certainly is fundamental to our view of modern economic 
systems, is the basis- on which policies ranging all the way from 
nationalisation to privatization have been justified, and provides an 
endless source of inspiration for the cartoonists pen. 
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let in the real world, the differences are less apparent« Companies 
of both types have achieved a certain technological size, they are managed 
hierarchically, and they operate in similar product and factor markets. 
Just as large private production units often have been able to reach and 
maintain their size by making the technological decision on the basis of a 
restricted choice set, so is the public enterprise faced with the same 
critical choices. Just as managers of large private firms have 
incorporated their own self interest into the objectives sought by their 
companies, so do public enterprise managers, often to the great 
consternation of government controlling agencies. Just as large private 
firms function in oligopolistic or- oligopsonistic markets with reduced 
efficiency pressures, so are large public enterprises subject to the same 
sort of environment. 
While there is no attempt made to deny the existence of real 
differences between the firms, there are indications of sufficient 
similarity to warrant testing a simple hypothesis for each of the surveys 
and using different dependent variables; 
Hypothesis: 
For large companies, there is no difference 
between public and private enterprises. 
Tables 9 through 13 summarize the regression results for the same surveys 
described above. The results are presented for regressions using data for 
all companies with complete cases. 
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1X1,1 Method 
Ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate the following 
regression: 
Dependent Variable = a.Private -*• a^Public + E (1) 
where Public and Private are dummy variables representing company 
ownership, and E is the residual vector. The procedure makes use of the 
commonality between multiple regression techniques and analysis of variance 
which are both variants of the General Linear Model,(Ward and Jennings, 
1973 and Korton, 1978} The indicates the additional percentage of the 
variance explained by including information about a firm's public or 
private ownership. The F statistic is calculated to test the hypothesis 
that: 
a, s a^ (2) 
Indications of significance for the coefficients and the F statistic are 
provided. 
III.2 Ratio of Net Income to Equity 
Comparison of the rate of return on equity for public and private 
enterprises should provide us with solid information about their 
profitability. The results presented In Table 9 for large companies 
worldwide offer a rather startling and partly counter-intuitive result, 
namely that the expected rate of return for both private and public 
enterprises in 1981 was negative. Clearly, the effects of the recession 
are manifest in those figures, and the lower of the two was that for public 
enterprises. While this result is demonstrated for the survey as. a whole, 
the sectoral coefficients conform more closely to ordinary expectations 
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that the ratio of net income to equity is negative for public enterprises 
and positive for private ones. The conclusion that public enterprises 
always provide a negative return to equity must be severely weakened as, 
with the exception of the public coefficient for mining and for steel, none 
of the coefficients for either type of firm are significantly different 
from zero. Further, to test the hypothesis as rigorously stated in 
Equation (2), F statistics were calculated. Only in the steel sector did 
coefficients differ significantly from each other. In every other sector 
except mining and in the survey as a whole, the hypothesis of no difference 
in expected rates of return cannot be rejected. For mining, the hypothesis 
of equal performance can only be rejected at the 5 percent level. 
To cast even more doubt on our folk wisdom-inspired preconceptions, 
the regression results clearly demonstrate that the public-private 
enterprise distinction is not a useful one in explaining financial 
performance. For the survey as a whole, only 0.16 percent of the variance 
is explained by this distinction. As expected, in the sectoral analysis, 
with a reduced number of degrees of freedom, a higher portion of the 
variance is explained, but only in mining does it barely exceed 25 percent. 
The only other data set for which rates of return on equity were able 
to be computed is that for Brazil, and the results are almost the opposite 
of those in Table 9. The Brazilian results shown in Table 11 indicate that 
for the survey as a whole the expected rates of return for both types of 
companies are positive, with that of public enterprises less than that of 
privste companies. Further, the coefficients not only are significantly 
different from zero, they are significantly different from each other. 
Also» the public-private dichotomy accounts for 7.5 percent of the 
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variance. The results are not so clear cut at the sectoral level, however, 
where for petroleum, mining and steel, the coefficients, are not, 
significantly different from zero and they are not significantly different 
fro® each other. Thus, the. behavior of both public and private firms in , % 
Brazil appears to differ from firms surveyed on a worldwide basis. »3 
In these mixed results, however, one thing is clearly apparent. To 
those critics who argue vehemently, whether from a position on the right or 
on the left of the political spectrum, that a public enterprise oust 
Invariably lose money simply because it is public, a closer look ¡at the 
data is recommended. Not only are there wide differences in performance 
among firas of any one type, those differences are such that attempts to 
explain performance simply on the basis of public or private share 
ownership patterns are without meaningful empirical contents 
III.3 Ratio of Met Income to Sales 
In the absence of data on equity, or where it exists to complement the 
earlier rate-of-return analysis, the ratio of net income to sales should 
exhibit differential patterns for public and private enterprises* 
Conventional expectations would hold that this ratio would be either 
negative for the public enterprises, or if positive consider-ably below that 
of private firms. The results are mixed. While the coefficients are 
x 
significant in both the worldwide (Table 9) and Latin American large data 
sets taken as a whole (Table 10), In the former a 9 < 0 < a1 while in the 
latter a? > a, > 0.(5) Worldwide, as expected, the ratio of net income to 
sales is negative for public enterprises and positive for private, while 
for Latin America, not only is the coefficient for the public firms 
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positive, it exceeds that of private firms. Drawing a general conclusion 
about comparative behavior becomes even sore difficult when the sectoral 
and country^level regression results are considered. For six of the 
regressions, the public enterprise estimated coefficient is negative, while 
that of the private firms is positive; in five of the regressions, both are 
positive and that for the public enterprises is higher. Ail this must be 
evaluated in the light of the caveat that in only two of the fifteen 
regressions estimated with the ratio of net income to sales as a dependent 
variable are the coefficients significantly different from each other. 
Again, public enterprises do not conform to the image of Invariable money 
losers. 
III.4 Ratio of Met Income to Assets 
As a comparative measure of rates of return, this measure, inferior to 
the two examined above, is the only one to conform to expectations. In all 
but two of the regressions, the estimated coefficient for public firms was 
lower than that for private. In five of the eleven, in addition to being 
lower, it was negative, while that for private firms was positive. In ail 
but four cases, however, one cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no 
difference between these two coefficients, and further, in most esses, the 
coefficients themselves are riot significantly different from zero. Thus, 
while conforming in general to expectation? that public enterprises do 
worse than private firms, these expectations are again left without a solid 
empirical backing. 
(5)To the extent that public enterprises are not able to enjoy the 
accounting benefits of multiple sets of books, their relative profitability 
cay b® biased upwards when compared to private companies which, it is 
alleged, keep two, three, or even four sets of accounts. 
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III.5 Batlo of Sales to Level of Employment 
The ratio of sales to the level of employment is employed as a 
dependent variable as an attempt to measure differential labor 
productivity. As the value of the average product of labor, we would 
®xpec-t the estimated coefficient for labor in private enterprises on the 
average to be higher than that for labor in public enterprises, since the 
latter are often assigned the social objective of job creation, We would 
further expect that such differences would be even more strongly marked 
when controlling for sector of economic activity, as in the total survey 
data differences among firms within the public or private sectors would 
balance cut somewhat. 
The results are startling. Since all five data sets contain the 
required information, this is the first dependent variable whose 
performance may be examined in the two multi-country surveys and in those 
of Brazil, Mexico and Peru, In no total survey did the public-private 
distinction explain more than one-half percent of the variance. Even ¡sore 
surprising, for the survey of large companies worldwide, and all its 
subsets except the largest petroleum, companies, for Latin American .mining 
and chemical sectors, for Mexico as a whole and for Mexican mining, the 
regressions .indicate that labor is more productive in public enterprises 
than in private firms. For ail the Brazilian and Peruvian data, Latin 
Aseriea as a wholes Latin American petroleum companies and Latin American 
steel, labor appears to be more productive in private companies. 
The indication of a dichotomy In'behavior patterns between public 
enterprises in Latin America, and those: in the rest of the world merits 
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further analysis. The relation may not necessarily he a strong one, as in 
only one case were there significant differences between types of 
companies, for of Latin American petroleum producers.(Ses Table 10) For the 
Brazil survey5 Brazilian petroleum and steel, Mexico as a whole, and 
Mexican mining, while the coefficients are significantly different froa 
zero, fchsy are not significantly different from each other. 
Ill„6 Ratio of Equity to Employment 
The ratio of equity to employaient may be examined as a measure of the 
cost of job creation. It is expected that if public enterprises are 
concentrated in heavy physical and industrial infrastructure, the cost to 
the shareholder (government) of direct job creation is higher than in the 
private firms.<6) These expectation are borne out in all cases except the 
Peruvian companies, where the government has deliberately and dangerously 
undercapitalised its public enterprises; steel mills in Mexico and Brazil; 
and the world's largest petroleum companies. Once again, our conclusion 
has to be weakened significantly, since in only three of the regressions 
are both coefficients significantly different froa zero. Moreover, in only 
two of the thirteen regressions are the coefficients significantly 
different from each other. 
III.7 Patio of Assets to Employment 
The ratio of assets to employment may also be employed as a dependent 
variable to examine the costs of job creation. Therefore, the expectations 
(o)Thls dependent variable in no way attempts to measure the multiplier 
effect of government investment in basic industry by creating jobs in those 
sectors which employ the output of a public enterprise as an Input to 
further transformation. 
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for the coefficient values conform closely to those of section III.6. The 
empirical results match quite closely, except for Mexican mining. All the 
Latin American results shown in Table 10, for which equity was not 
measured, fit in with expectations. Again, however, roost of the results, 
while striking in conforming to expected wisdom, are not significantly 
different from each other. Only for the full worldwide survey data, the 
entire Latin American data, and the entire Mexican data, were the 
coefficients significantly different from each other, and even this limited 
significance is weakened, since for the first two of these, both 
coefficient values were not significantly different fros zero. When 
stratified by sector of action, no significant differences ware found. 
•Ill. 8 Current Ratio 
Information on the current ratio is only available through these 
surveys for the Brazilian companies. One would expect that if the public 
enterprises are starved for funds as a result of undercapitalisation by 
government authorities, and/or price controls, then the ratio of current 
assets to current liabilities would be higher for private than for public 
firms. The regression results support this contention, though only for the 
Brazilian steel companies is the difference significant, and that only at 
the five percent level. 
III.9 Debt/Equity Ratio 
A last measure examined, also only for the Brazilian case, is the. 
ratio of debt to equity, Since public enterprise debts ultimately carry 
the guarantee of the nation, we would expect the debt/equity ratio to be 
higher for.them than for the private firms. The data bear this out in all 
cases, though only t.i half of them are the coefficients significantly 
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different from each other. 
IV, CONCLUSIONS 
A standard working assumption of policy analysts, policy makers, and 
the public in general. Is that there are marked performance differences 
between public and private enterprises. These differences were supposed to 
arise in part because of the circumstances under which public enterprises 
were created, in part because of the circumstances under which they were 
expected to operate, and In part because of their increasingly bureaucratic 
ossification over time. This paper indicates that if a substantial 
revision of this assumption is not undertaken, then detailed, further study 
to verify that it does, in fact, held true Is in order. In part, our 
traditional taxonoalc and historical views of the motives for which public 
enterprises were created, and of the timing of their formation need 
revision in the light of recent closer looks at specific country cases in 
Latin America- A structural approach stressing the interrelationships 
between a set of underlying economic, political and social variables to 
public enterprise formation, growth and dissolution is suggested. 
The empirical testing of the hypothesis that there is no difference 
between public and private enterprises for eight different performance 
criteria led to two striking results. First, the coefficient values 
themselves generally.are not.significantly different from zero Indicating 
that there is a substantial variance in the performance criteria within the 
categories of public or private enterprises, and that on the average 
knowing a company's ownership will tell little about that company's' 
performance. Second, and more startling, the coefficient values for 
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private and public ownership are generally not significantly different from 
each other indicating no major performance differences between private and 
public enterprises, even when controlling for sector of economic activity. 
These results mean that our traditional preconceptions, often expressed in 
the pages of private business-oriented publications in the phrases "state. M> 
losers" or "parasitic parastatals," may need to undergo revision. Indeed. 
the generalized absence of any statistically significant differences 
between public and private enterprises should prompt additional serious 
quantitative study. While certainly not definitive in its conclusions, the 
analysis reported in this paper indicates that further reappraisal is 
definitely in order. 
One evident direction for future research is to attempt to replicate 
this study for other time periods, for other countries and with a broader 
set of variables. This would have two main benefits. First, it would 
enable, among others, various hypotheses to be tested empirically 
including: 
1. whether 1981 was an anomaly for public enterprises; 
2. whether there has been an unnoticed trend among public enterprises 
to greater economic/financial self-sufficiency: 
'i'jjX 
3. whether the large public enterprises examined in this paper behave 
differently from their smaller counterparts; ""•*J 
whether public enterprises are better insulated from the effects 
of world recessions than are private firms; and/or 
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5« whether public enterprises receive special preferential treatments 
from governments. 
Certainly, many snore may be added to this list of unanswered questions. 
Second, further research may permit pinpointing measures of 
significant differences between private and public firms. Such measures, 
if and when identified, could form the basis for designing a monitoring 
system for controlling agencies to assess how a public enterprise meets its 
"public* objectives. In addition, these measures could provide a concrete 
set of benchmarks against which company Management could assess 
performance. 
Third, the results of this paper also irsply the need for reconsidering 
the implicit bas-es for designing a control system. To the extent that the 
financial and management control mechanisms, often imposed to prevent 
worsening of a public enterprise's income statement or balance sheet, and 
often serving to produce exactly the opposite results, may prove 
superfluous, the need for a change in the nature of public enterprise-
government relations should be recognized. This change should be in the 
direction of making the government's relation to the public enterprises 
more clearly resemble the government'3 relation to private companies since 
the companies themselves resemble each other. In general this implies 
greater autonomy in action for government-owned firms, with greater 
management accountability in final results than the current systems, which 
often severely limit managerial autonomy and managerial discretion in 
operational decisions, while providing management rewards irrespective of 
performance in meeting objectives. 
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Finally, an additional conclusion, the recommendation of which will 
only be buttressed should vhe indication of little significant difference 
between public and private enterprises be borne out in further research, 
but which basically cosies from a consideration of optimal resource 
allocation between public and private sectors, is that public enterprises 
should no longer expect to benefit from special preferences or to suffer 
the consequences of punitive treatment from governments, when compared to 
government behavior to private firms. Taxes, personnel decisions, 
availability of foreign exchange for imports and promotion of exports, when 
considered as global policy instruments, should be administered by the 
central government in an impartial manner irrespective of the ownership 
status of the company to which they may be applied. 
TUBLE 1: PUBLIC ENTERPRISE OBJECTIVES; TAXOHOMIC APPROACH 
1» To Increase government control of the national economy 
2, To discipline private enterprise through nationalization or 
through preemption of certain sectors through government monopoly 
3. To generate government revenues or surpluses for investment 
M. To enhance national autonomy vis-a-vis international influences 
and enterprises 
5. To safeguard the ''defense of the realm5', 
6. To stimulate private enterprise directly or indirectly 
7. To supplement private enterprise by filling gaps which private 
enterprise may leave open 
8. To provide services and utilities not considered appropriate for 
the private sector 
9. To provide social and cultural services neglected by the private 
sector 
10, To correct market power outcomes in the interest of politically 
desired goals 
11, To participate with private enterprise in mixed or joint ventures 
12, To channel monetary savings into risk capital 
13« To Intensify capital accumulation 
To undertake government programs profitable only over the 
long-term 
15. To rescue "sick" industries 
16. To reduce regional disequilibria 
17. To foster job creation 
18. To counterbalance the influence of transnational firms 
1?. To promote incase distribution 
?C. To increase the rate of development and/or technology transfer 
21, To foster regional economic integration and regional cooperation 
Source: Muhaisoad, PP. 6-9. 
TABLE 2: MAJOR STRUCTURAL FACTORS EXPLAINING PUBLIC ENTERPRISE GRGWT 
1. Growth in per-capita income 
2. Income redistribution 
3. rease in perceived tax burden 
4. Shifts in relative prices for public goods and services 
5. Increase in population 
6. Change in population growth rates 
?. Increase in level of industrial activity 
8. Increased urbanisation 
9. Decrease in relative sise of agriculture 
10. Increase in needs for social overhead capital 
11 » Technological change 
12. Extension of voting rights 
13. Formation and increase in activities of interest groups 
1ft. Changes in ideology and/or social philosophy 
15. Permanence of temporary changes in levels of activity 
16. Bureaucratic expansionism 
17. Increasing costs of hierarchical activities 
* 
18. Changes in class interests 
19. Government legitimization of capital accumulation 
Table 3: DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC ENTITIES BY TWO-DIGIT 
STANDARD INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION: PERU, BRAZIL, MEXICO, 198.1 
Peru Brazil Mexico 
11 Agriculture and Hunting N " . N .. X N 8 2.3 26 2,4 5 .6 
12 Forestry and togging 0 .0 6 .6 3 .3 
13 Fishing 36 10.5 3 .3 3 .3 
21 Coal Mining 1 .3 4 .4 2 .2 
22 Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Production 2 .6 0 0 0 0 
23 Metal Ore Mining 8 2.3 5 .5 11 1.2 
29 Other Mining 5 1,5 60 5.6 9 1.0 
31 Manufacture cf Food, Beverages and Tobacco 5 1.5 18 1.7 91 10.1 
32 Textile, Wearing Apparel and Leather Industries 3 .9 3 .3 15 1.7 
33 Manufacture of Wood and Wood Products, Including Furniture 5 1.5 0 0 14 1.6 34 Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products, Printing and Publishing 7 2.0 26 2.4 16 1.8 
35 Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical, Petroleum, Coal, Rubber, and Plastic 6 1.7 41 3.9 ' 35 3.9 
Products 35 Manufacture of ton-Metallic Mineral Products,except Products of Petroleum arid Coal 7 2,0 0 0 4 .4 3? Basic Metal Industries 2 .6 26 2.4 13 • 1.4 
38' Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment 30 8.7 8 .8 49 5.4 39 Other Manufacturing Industries 5 1.5 2 .2 6 .7 
41 Electricity, Gas and Steam 6 1.7 71 6.7 17 1.9 <12 Water Works and Supply 0 0 43 4.0 0 0 
50 Construction 1 .3 10 .9 8 .9 
61 Wholesale Trade 4 1.2 30 2.8 16 1.8 
62 Retail Trade 1 .3 6 .6 0 0 
63 Restuarants and Motels 1 .3 1 ,1 11 1.2 
71 Transport and Storage 12 3.5 112 10,5 35 3.9 
72 Ccr̂ unication, Postal 38 11.0 52 5.8 5 .6 
81 Financial Institutions, Banks 27 7.8 137 12.9 104 11.5 
82 Insurance . 1 .3 15 1.4 3 .3 
83 Real Estate and Business Services 5 1.5 28 2.6 52 5.8 
91 Public Administration and Defense • 13 3.8 73 6.9 5 .6 
$2 S.vs t \ry and Similar Services 3 .9 29 2.7 1 .1 
3.3 ̂ c-i.':] and Related Community Services 86 25.0 185 17.4 120 13.3 
S-1 rational and Cultural Services ' 9 2.6 27 2.5 28 3.1 <;s ¡-'r r- cnal and Household Services , 2 .6 0 a 1 .1 
•;'-! '.'.:' '.'••Vvfi 3 .9 6 ,6 219 24.3 TOTAL 3 «1*4 10'O"~ 1064 i o O 100.0 
OPSS Archives 
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Tabi e 4 : DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR WORLD MANUFACTURING COMPANIES, 1981 
Tota"! Survey 
Public Private 
. Petroleum Companies 




Assets (U.S.Sm) {%} 
58 




































































1 6 . 2 
Equity (U.S.Îm) 95245 
{%) 21.2 
•let 'Income1̂ .S.$m) 3316 
(%) 













































































SOURCE: Fortune, August 23, 1982 
if positive 
"sithoMt the YPF disaster, the figures would be: 3 4 242 
12,3 87.7 . 
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Table 5 : DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LARGE LATIN AMERICAN COMPANIES, 1981J 
Total Survey 
Pub!ic Private 
Number of Companies 71 143 
{%) 33.2 66,8 







5 9 . 8 40.2 
Jetrolftum Coppanies 
(X) 
Sales (U.S,$m) {%) 
Ass2í5l(U.S.$m) 
(%) 










































































































SOURCE; látin American Times, December 1982. 
Because of incomplete data entries in the published figures, sample composition is as follows: Brazi1-165 of 224 companies; 
Mc<xico-l of 111.companies; Vene*ue1a-6 of 54 companies; Argentina-0 of 45 companies; Chile-6 of 20 companies; Colombia-25 of 27 companies: 
Peru-7 of 13 companies; Ecuador-0 of 1 company; Uruguay-1 of 1 comp a n y ; Bolivia-1 of 1 company; Honduras-1 of 1 company; 
Latin Acericm joint ventures-? o f 2 companies. 
o only provides assets of Brazilian firms to December 31, 1979. 









Pubii c Private 











6 0 . 0 
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77.8 




































Net Income (Cr $m) 669338 • 382897 103775 24296 
{%) 63.6 36.4 81.0 19.0 
150 







































SOURCE: Vjsfo, August 31, 1982 
The year-end exchange dollar rate for Brazil was Cr $127,8. 
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Table 7: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR MEXICAN COMPANIES, 1980 
Total Survey. 



































































SOURCE: Expansion August 19, 1981 
The year-end exchange dollar rate for Mexico' V a s Pesos $23.3, 
Table 8 : DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR PERUVIAN COMPANIES, 1981 
Total Survey 
Public Private 
















t (S/.m) 152466 153201 
{%) . 49.1 50.9 
_oss (S/.m) 81686 2457 
i ^ t . 97.1 2.9 
Employees 92224 28188 
(55) 76,6 23.4 
SOURCE: Peru Economico, September 1982 
The year-end exchange dollar rate for Peru was S/.506.2. 
» 
$ 



















Net Income/Assets -.021*** 
.188 
2 8 . 1 9 1 * * * 
.025*** .0620 31,250*** 
(.008) (.003) 
Ecui ty/Eniployrcent 1.33 .276 .0085 4.063*-* 
(.493) (.184) 
Sales/Employment 2.777 1.200** .0014 .636 
(1.264) (-471) 
Assets/Emp1oyment 4.130 1.096 .,0081 3.874** 
(1,433) (,538) 
¡Mining C ompànies <N»21) 
Met Income/Equity ~.48SA* .110 .2642 6.496** 
(.198) (.126) 
fict Income/Sales ,024 . 060 .0155 .324 
(.056) (.035) 
?iet Income/Assets ,006 .044 .0685 1.407 
(.027) (.017) 
Equity/Employment 1.576 ,044 .1227 2.6S8 
{'• 794) (.502) 
J a ! :'s/t->j) 1 evident 4.063** .144 ,1449 3.219 
(1.849) (1.169) 
7.272 .139 .1316 2.879 
(3,553) (2,247) 
* -i ' * 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS: 
ViORLD MANUFACTURING COMPANIES, 1981 
Petroleum C o m p a n i e s ( N a 7 1 ) 
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Steel C o m p a n i e s (N«36) 
Public* ^2 Private* R* 
Calculated 
F+ Public* ^2 Private* R2 
Calculated 
F+ 
-.323 .435 .0316 2,220 -. 369** ~ ,074 ,1543 2.446 
(.423) (.283) (.154) (.109) 
-.011 .017 .0165 1.160 -.039** .007 .2639 9,198*** 
(.022) (.015) (.028) (.020) 
-.001 ,023 .0127 .847 »,065** .008 ,2565 9.520*'-
(.021) (.014) (.019) (.014) 
.120 .369 ,0054 ,384 .5.437 .024 ,0677 2.467 
(.334} (,224) (2.814) (1.990) 
.783 3,300 .0077 .534 7,589** .106 ,1104 4.221 
(2,865) (1.920) (2.974) (2.103) 
.506 2.'509 .0065 .454 15.381** .130 .1128 4 322 
(2.470) (1.655) (5,990) (4.236) 





































* Standard error of coefficient in paret&hes« 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
'<** Significant at the 1 percent 1evr-i 
+ F test for the hypothesis: There is 
no difference between coefficients. 
Asterisks denote level at which 
hypothesis may be rejected. 
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Table 10 : REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS: 
LARGE LATIN AMERICAN COMPANIES, 1381 
. Independent 


































. 7202 25.735*** 











































.0277 .143 • ,175 
(-073) 
„112 • 
( .039 ) 
.0285 . 585 
'1 -2 
JiàU£*, .Jximfeeg. 




















* Standard error of coefficient in paroitbest,: 
** Significant, at the 5 percent levl 
Significant at the 1 percent level • 
+ F test for the hypothesis: There is 
no difference between coefficients. 
Asterisks dénota level at which 
hypothesis may be rejected. 
Table 11: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS: 














Public* Private* RS Calculated 






























r Petrol eu?«.Companies (N*?) 
dl 
Public* Private* 
.070*** .165*** ,0750 14.211*** .204 .274 
(.019) (.016) (.032) (.052) 
-, 562 .237 .0065 1.073 ,043*** .022*** 
(.585) (.502) (.008) (.005) 
1.333*** 1.540*** .0014 ,251 1.29.5*** 1.378 
(.306) (.263) (.168) (.106) 
49.363*** 39.599*** .0626 11.686*** 55.100*** 52.920 
(2.168) (.1,859) (2.235) (1.414) 
55.794*** 31,988*** ,0134 1,829 13.461*** 9.371*** 
13.364) (11.460) (2,802) (1.772) 
10.116*** 13.748***' ,0055 .967 82.219** 102.433*** 




















































Standard error o f 
coefficients in 
parentheses 
Significant at the 5 
percent level 
^Significant at the 1 
percent level 
F test, for the hypothe-
sis: There is no dif-
ference between coefficients. 
Asterisks denote level 
at which hypothesis may 
be rejected, 
¡•+ Debt x 100 
Equity" 
4 The year-end exchange dollar 
rate for Brazil was Cr $127,8. 
Independent .. 
Variables 
Table 12: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS ; 
MEXICO'S LARGEST COMPANIES, 1981 
Total Survey (N»476) Steel Companies (H-12). 
Dependent 
Variables 
£qu i ty/EmpI oynient # 
Sales/Employment § 

















t., *1 2 
Public* Private* Rc Calculated 
F+ 
•,2 








( 454) (.203) 
.0128 .130 
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Mining Companies (N-7) 
h 2 „ 








.647** .1409 .320 
(.205) 





* Standard error of coefficient In parentheses. 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
+ f test for the hypothesis: There is «0 difference between coefficients, Asterisks denote level at which hypothesis may be rejected. 
# The year-end exchange dollar rate for Mexico was Pesos $23,3. 
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Table 13: REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS AND STANDARD ERRORS: 
PERU'S LARGEST COMPANIES, 1981 
Prof11/Gros sin come 


















"ess Income/Employments 58.384 









* Standard error of coefficient in parentheses 
** Significant at the 5 percent level 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level 
+ F test for the hypothesis: There is no difference between coefficients 
Asterisks denote level at which hypothesis may be rejected. 
f The year-end exchange dollar rate for Peru was S/.506.2. 
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